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GUERILLA DECISIONMAKING: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF RISK 
ASSESSMENTS’ 
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, Jr. 
University of Washington, Seattle, DC 98105 (U.S.A.) 
(Received May 1986; accepted June 1988) 
Summary 
This paper describes four types of uncertainty confronted by decisionmakers undertaking risk 
assessments. It then discusses individual and institutional responses to uncertainty; these include 
both formal attempts to acquire more information, and pragmatic efforts to isolate and act upon 
salient considerations. The tendency of .decisionmakers to narrow the agenda and search for a 
decisive datum or metaphor is called guerilla decisionmaking. Courts oversee agency decisions by 
techniques known widely in the legal community as the hard-look doctrine. This doctrine is defined, 
and the case law is used to illustrate how courts insist upon identification of salient risk-assess- 
ment factors and the production of information on all four types of uncertainty. 
Introduction 
While risk assessments occur in many legal contexts, the dominant one is 
in judicial review of administrative agency decisions. Each year, hundreds of 
agency judgments on societal risks are reviewed in the courts at the behest of 
parties aggrieved by the administrative choices. The courts engaged in this 
review, no less than other institutions, are creatures of their environment. An 
understanding of how these courts behave is assisted by recognizing that their 
agendas are set chiefly by the administrative agencies whose judgments are 
subject to review. Judges do no more than stake out the permissible reach of 
discretionary agency choice; the law marks the limits of judicial tolerance. We 
have here no models of perfection, no prescriptions for reform. Courts, in a 
sense, act as predators culling out unacceptable forms of administrative behav- 
ior. Predatory oversight in the courts of appeal tells us only that some admin- 
*This paper was prepared for the AAAS Annual Meeting, New York, NY, May 24-29,1984, Sym- 
posium on Uncertainty in the Law and Science of Health Risk Assessment, and has been updated 
and revised. 
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istrative decisionmaking phenotypes* are unsuited for perpetuation. Survivors, 
of course, are not the best; they are only good enough, and they have charac- 
teristics that may be perpetuated in the population. 
Agency decisions, as the prey in this drama, confront a variety of stresses 
that influence survival rates in the courts of appeal. Among these, the domi- 
nant one is uncertainty. Uncertainty, to be sure, is rampant in the physical 
and social sciences, often in ways that are alien to the legal profession which 
tends to equate thoroughness of inquiry with approximation of truth. Uncer- 
tainty is a cloak of many colors, however, and lends itself to a descriptive typol- 
ogy distinguishing between four different types of unknowns. We will pursue 
these descriptive differences in the expectation that they will lead to deeper 
understanding of judicial review. 
Four types of uncertainty 
1 Data uncertainty 
Decisionmaking under uncertainty commonly means that the decision- 
maker lacks the facts to make a considered choice. The fossil-record, for exam- 
ple, offers a limited peek at the past; it reluctantly yields grab-bag samples, 
tantalizingly incomplete, heavily skewed by geological caprice [ 11. Notwith- 
standing the gaps, however, the bits and pieces have been put to use to support 
sweeping inferential judgments. Nothing less than the evolutionary history of 
human beings has been rewritten and corrected many times [ 2 J . There is no 
other choice except to suspend judgment indefinitely. 
2 Indeterminacy 
A second type of uncertainty arises out of attempts to answer questions that 
have no answer. The obvious example comes from quantum mechanics where 
we are told “it is not possible, even in principle, to know enough about the 
present to make a complete prediction about the future” [ 3]. Heisenburg’s 
famous uncertainty principle holds that in the subatomic realm we cannot 
know both the position and momentum of a particle with absolute precision; 
the more we know about one, the less we know about the other. Future behavior 
cannot be predicted, only approximated by probability statements. Elsewhere 
in the sciences, much investigation takes place in a minefield of presently 
unanswerable questions, which are often treated as black boxes “inaccessible 
to explanation” [ 4 1. 
‘To pursue the metaphor, the agency decision is better viewed as an entire population, as courts 
are able to disapprove selectively parts of the rationale, some of the studies relied upon, or partic- 
ular techniques used. It is an authority to disapprove the antlers of the Irish Elk while endorsing 
the rest of the beast. There is also some kind of Lamarckian evolution at work since courts believe, 
at least provisionally, that they can change agency policy by the simple expedient of giving helpful 
and advice. 
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3 Nonrecurring and nonreplicabk events 
A third type of uncertainty arises out of attempts to understand events that 
are nonrecurring or nonreplicable. I call this historical uncertainty. Inquiries 
into these mysteries suffer from fact shortages and indeterminacies but also 
from information barriers unique to understanding events that come around 
but once. There are observation problems; we get but one quick look, and no 
chance for further verification by experimentation [ 51. There are interpreta- 
tion problems: archeologists [ 61 and historians [ 7,8] can offer only plausible 
accounts of the past, faced as they are by such imponderables as where to stop, 
what to exclude, and what it all means. With increasing complexity, chains of 
causation become matters of opinion. Attempts to understand historical events 
also illustrate that, for purposes of uncertainty standing in the way of choice, 
information overload is functionally indistinguishable from information 
underload. Many of the rocks and debris of historical research, deserving sum- 
mary rejection, mimic valuable finds and appear in the guise of something 
useful. In history, the uniqueness of past events and their defiance of single 
descriptions encourages us to accept a high degree of variability in accounts of 
what “really” happened. 
Predicting nonrecurring events returns us to the realm of the indeterminate. 
The risks flow from events that have not been observed because they have not 
happened. Opinions count heavily here, and those who venture an opinion are 
called risk-assessors, or futurists, or soothsayers. 
4 Transcientific or global policy choice 
Alvin Weinberg has given the name transcientific to high policy questions 
that may be asked of science but are not answerable by science [ 9,101. Ques- 
tions of this sort are not answerable because they require physical predictions 
that cannot be made (e.g., rates of accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere) 
and social choices that cannot be defended. Any choice obliges the decision- 
maker to predict the unpredictable, compare the incommensurable, identify 
elusive political or cultural preferences, respond to ever-changing constituen- 
cies, choose among values, and elevate one discipline over another. Uncer- 
tainty here is rarely overcome by consensus opinions of qualified experts; many 
opinions count in these cases, and any sampling of opinion is bound to be 
tentative as views and information are constantly changing. Decisions to wage 
war, move against acid rain, or curtail the fumigant EDB are of this type. Gen- 
eralized, transcientific or global policy decisionmaking is what is usually meant 
by public policy decisionmaking. 
The four types of uncertainty in the regulation of toxics 
In regulating toxic substances, it is evident that all four types of uncertain- 
ties stand in the way of confident judgments. Any single decision confronts 
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numerous data shortages, including unknowns about groups exposed, routes 
of exposure, patterns and practices of uses, behavior of chemicals within the 
environment [ 11-141. Indeterminate questions abound, including the shape 
of the dose-response curves, the relevance of animal studies, the relationship 
of exposures to effects observed in epidemiological studies, and even whether 
there are safe threshold levels for exposures to given substances [ 15-17 1. His- 
torical uncertainty is rampant. Even the easy cases (saccharine is commonly 
mentioned) offer a virtual blank in assessing the costs and benefits of a prod- 
uct used for years by over fifty million people [ 181. These problems are also 
demonstrably nonrecurring in any physical sense; the sheer chemistry of the 
mixtures at many of the waste disposal sites is not duplicable, for example, 
leaving in its wake unanswerable questions about causes and effects 
[ 15-17,19,20]. The difficulties of predicting what will happen and what to do 
about it combine to make the regulation of toxics prototypical of transcientific 
or global policy choices. 
Individual and institutional responses to uncertainty 
While uncertainty may offer sufficient grounds for not deciding, choice is 
often obligatory. One reason is that uncertainty is an inevitable component of 
any decision. Uncertainty must be coped with, and different types of uncer- 
tainty are solved in different ways. 
For data uncertainty, one option is to suspend judgment, pending the gath- 
ering of additional facts. As individuals, we may pause to collect the best avail- 
able evidence or pursue studies. Decisionmaking institutions may do this and 
more; they may attempt to extend the visibility by modeling, decision trees, 
and the other apparatus of contemporary rational decisionmaking [ 211. Along 
the way tactical battles against uncertainty are fought with reasoned assump- 
tions, consensus opinions, and qualified guesses. Stopped short, the search for 
more information is dangerously incomplete. Carried too far, it produces the 
scorched-earth excesses of formal decisionmaking. 
How much additional information is required to decide is a matter of sharp 
debate. An economist is likely to recommend that more facts be pursued until 
the costs of collection exceed the benefits of an improved decision [ 221, A 
philosopher might say that potential losers deserve at least a best-efforts 
attempt to answer the open questions [ 221. Lawyers are inclined to speak in 
terms of burdens of coming forward and of persuasion [ 23-251, assigning 
information-producing responsibilities to different parties under different 
circumstances. 
Eventually, uncertainties can be combatted only by nonrational, intuitive, 
or creative models of thought. As individuals, we are walking advertisements 
for resisting massive introspection and information overload. Humans are pro- 
grammed to compute on the basis of limited data, to the extent of being given 
“underprivileged access” to what’s going on in our minds [ 26 1. We pay atten- 
tion only to considerations that jump out at us as salient, unusual, disruptive 
of the normal pattern, “mismatches” in the accustomed flow of information 
[ 271. This “salient consideration” mode of decisionmaking is assisted by pat- 
terned responses to uncertain, stressful, and confusing situations; we may act 
by avoiding the worst case or the catastrophic outcome, adhering to past prac- 
tice, striving for margins of safety, following the crowd, or isolating the man- 
ageable [ 28-301. This kind of decisionmaking involves a search for salient and 
controlling factors, and the acting upon them until some better advice comes 
along. 
Our risk assessment institutions, too, are torn between the needs for more 
study and provisional choice. On the one hand, comprehensive decisionmaking 
is greedy for facts [ 31,321, and serves agency purposes of more money, staffing, 
conflict-avoidance and decision-delay [ 33 ] . Statutes such as the National 
Environmental Policy Act have encouraged the extension of formal decision- 
making. On the other hand, choice in the presence of limitations is inescapable. 
Agencies often find themselves obliged to shun formal analyses in favor of 
more functional, stripped down, and pragmatic forms of decisionmaking. Some 
agencies and advisory bodies have pursued worst case analyses [ 34-361, com- 
parative analyses (which ask whether the universe of risk will be improved by 
replacing an existing product with another) [ 18,37 1, or a strictly limited com- 
parison of health gains with health costs. (This is called a “risk-risk” frame- 
work of regulation [ 381.) Agencies may ask questions such as whether a 
tentative policy choice will be reversible later [ 391, and they may make rule- 
of-thumb assessments about “the relative risks of underprotection as com- 
pared to overprotection” [ 40,411. All of this amounts to policy groping, 
attempting to deal provisionally with the many uncertainties standing in the 
way of definitive choices. 
My name for decisional strategies that seek to isolate and act upon salient 
considerations is guerilla decisionmaking. The practice seeks out the short 
agenda, a handful of options, and the compelling metaphor. Characterization 
of the risk (for example, as catastrophic) is often the decisive step in analysis. 
Guerrilla decisionmaking is opportunistic, provisional, ad hoc, a search not so 
much for crucial links in the chain but rather for obstacles that can be over- 
come. It is a divide and conquer strategy, one that isolates the manageable and 
postpones the obscure. It is a strategy attuned to targets of opportunity, and a 
search for dispositive factors. It seeks not some ideal “best” outcome, but only 
one that is good enough given the multiple constraints and ever-present 
uncertainty. 
Under guerilla decisionmaking acceptability of risks turns not upon global 
assessments of costs and benefits but upon emergence of a single, or a handful, 
of “controlling” considerations that are sensitive measures of the economic, 
psychological, political and legal acceptability of a given risk. These consid- 
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erations, which are no mystery to writers in the field or close observers of 
technological conflict, include: 
1. voluntariness [ 42,43 ] ; 
2. catastrophic nature [ 441; 
3. comparability to natural risks [ 451; 
4. universality (e.g., the widespread dissemination of PCBs, DDT and lead) ; 
5. government sponsorship (swine flu is commonly mentioned); 
6. vulnerability of the target group [ 46,471; 
7. necessity (the example most often cited is that of fluorocarbons); 
8. familiarity of the risk; [ l&48,49] ; 
9. immediacy of anticipated effects [ 441; 
10 de minimis nature [ 501. 
While these indicators may be in conflict and do not always control outcomes, 
they offer surprisingly convincing explanations for a number of well-known 
policy decisions. 
Hard-look doctrine defined 
The legal name that has been given to the judicial review of risk-assessment 
decisionmaking is the hard-look doctrine (the term was coined by the late 
Judge Harold Leventhal) [ 51-551, although it has some decidedly soft-glance 
components. Courts take a hard look at agency explanations, a soft glance at 
their policy choices. Distinguishing between the two is one of the great diffi- 
culties of contemporary environmental law. 
It is possible to describe with some particularity ( and even to predict) [ 561 
how courts will respond to administrative choices pertaining to societal risk. 
Typically, a court will be confronted by industrial and commercial claimants 
saying the restrictions went too far, and by environmental or health groups 
claiming they didn’t go far enough. The court, usually in this order, will subject 
the administrative decision and its accompanying rationale to three tests of 
acceptability. First, it will read confidently the legislative charter under which 
the agency is acting to make sure the prescribed decisionmaking model is fol- 
lowed (for example, cost-benefit, cost-effectiveness, or cost-oblivious) [ 571. 
A second crucial feature of this review is the “incessant demand’ of the courts 
for “reasoned decisionmaking” [ 58-601. The indispensible requirement here 
is the sufficiency of the agency’s explanation because fulfillment of the func- 
tions of judicial review is utterly dependent upon the agency being able to 
explain what it did. The hard look that is taken at the agency explanation, and 
often also at its justification, appears in close proximity to the soft glance that 
is extended to the assumptions and policy choices bound up in the decision. 
While the courts feel confident in demanding an accounting, they quickly reach 
questions foreign to their expertise and beyond their competence if they quar- 
rel with technical assumptions or second-guess a policy choice. A third impor- 
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tant feature of judicial review, also having its hard-look and soft-glance 
components, is the issue of procedural regularity. Courts are not at all bashful 
about enforcing the procedural rules prescribed by the Congress but are atten- 
tive also to tolerating decisionmaking experimentation that may very well be 
necessary for satisfactory resolution of global policy issues [ 611. 
Taken together, these three ingredients of skeptical judicial oversight have 
come to be known as the hard-look doctrine of judicial review. They illustrate 
that the judicial function is confined chiefly to process considerations. The 
courts make sure the rules of Congress are applied by agencies able to give a 
reasoned defense to the outcomes they propose. It is true, moreover, that the 
long roster of process rights that emerge (e.g., rights to have methodology 
explained, studies disclosed, and objections answered) are not linked to the 
peculiar vulnerabilities of the victims of low-level pollution or widely dissem- 
inated carcinogens. Victims have these rights, but so do the commercial enti- 
ties who suffer economically from restrictions on product uses. The hard look 
offers value-neutral administrative due process rights, available to polluters 
and victims alike [ 551, Every user of DDT or EDB, and every unwilling con- 
sumer of them, may have a day in court. 
The process-intensive features of judicial review are not surprising. The usual 
reasons of institutional limits serve as strong precautions against judicial entry 
into the empirical thickets and policy minefields associated with the regulation 
of environmental hazards. Process, in the short run, is a kind of nonzero-sum 
good where A can be favored with a procedural entitlement without exacting a 
reciprocal toll from B [ 621. It is easier for the courts to recognize or invent 
these “new” rights without discernible iosers than to wade into the fray with 
substantive pronouncements where victory for B is understood as a setback 
for A [ 631. Process rights are a popular currency among attorneys, who dom- 
inate the litigation and legislation processes, and not only for the obvious rea- 
son that more process means more work for lawyers. Procedural proliferation 
also is a convenient option for any decisionmaker searching for a “correct” 
outcome, or even a guiding ethic, where no substantive choice is clearly rec- 
ommended. Under this view, “justice” becomes any outcome that happens to 
be churned out by just procedures; it is unnecessary, in the end, to choose 
between irreconcilable values. 
Judicial enforcement of salient decisional criteria 
Courts assume a role both in isolating risk assessment criteria and assuring 
that all types of uncertainties are accounted for adequately by agency deci- 
sions. The strict reading that is given to the legislative charters is the technique 
for giving prominence to certain aspects of the risk being evaluated. In this 
instance, the courts forego their normal preference for process solutions but 
their boldness is attributed to legislative choice. 
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Several writers have pointed out that the Congress regularly departs from a 
benefit-cost decisionmaking model [ 64,651. One option, which I call the cost- 
oblivious model [66], explicitly rules out the consideration of economics in 
achieving the statutory objectives, such as the protection of health [ 671 or of 
nonhuman endangered species [ 681. Many analysts [ 69-711 are sharply crit- 
ical of statutes of this sort - the Delaney Amendment [ 72-751 is an especially 
attractive target - on the grounds that no conceivable version of a rational 
decision can be built on absolutes such as protecting snail darters [ 761, for- 
bidding the introduction of all pollutants into the water [ 771, or keeping car- 
cinogens out of the food supply [ 72-751. 
Most explanations of these cost-oblivious or absolutist legislative charters 
do little to rehabilitate the practice. These legislative choices may represent a 
preemptive judgment representing an advance assessment of costs [ 781 that 
is likely to founder on the specifics of individual cases. They may be an expres- 
sion of gut-level morality [ 791 that coincidentally calls for inordinate sacri- 
fices from those not favored legislatively. Or they may represent the leftover 
choices of a simpler age before technology made it possible to detect poisons 
in the range of parts per billion [ 83 1. 
Another interpretation of the cost-oblivious statutes, not inconsistent with 
the morality view, is that they represent the provisional elevation of a limited 
question to a place of prominence on the policy agenda. Whatever the criteria 
for a “best” or “complete” decision, it is not written in stone that a single 
decisionmaker must make all the choices. Referrals of properly isolated ques- 
tions are the norm, not the extreme, of internal agency decisions. Although the 
proposition is by no means unanimous [ 811, one can think of good reasons for 
asking an agency to prescribe health-based or ambient-air emission standards, 
reserving for another body (perhaps the Congress itself) questions that arise 
about costs of compliance. We might have greater confidence in health-based 
standards of this sort because they are divorced from the politics of compli- 
ance, free from a comparison of incommensurables (posed classically by choices 
between health and job losses caused by industry shutdown), and less demand- 
ing of new and untested methodologies. 
This vision of a provisional, tentative, or partial referral carries with it a 
perspective of public policy choice that departs from the legal norm. The dom- 
inant legal model, built no doubt on experience with limited disputes and single 
answers, expects definitive resolution within a prescribed time. Public policy 
choices on many topics today, including the controversial toxics (DDT, PCBs 
and many others), proceed with no end in sight, a progression of partial deci- 
sions, giving way to the next partial decision built on shifting coalitions, new 
information, and mosaic values. In this world, conflict is the norm, reconsi- 
deration the prospect, and choice always is provisional. 
By reading restrictive charters as an expression of provisional choice courts 
cooperate in the guerrilla or “salient consideration” decisionmaking agencies 
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are obliged to resort to. This charter-reading responsibility also makes it pos- 
sible for the courts to enforce central values - or, less elegantly, the provisional 
choice of the moment - against agencies who succumb to the temptations of 
massive formal analyses. The charters, and the detectable policies behind them, 
often suggest a dominant approach to risk evaluation that may recommend an 
outcome in a surprisingly large number of cases. 
Reasoned decisionmaking 
Apart from charter-reading responsibilities giving hints about the accepta- 
bility of risk, the task of judicial review is devoted mostly to improving agency 
decisionmaking in the face of uncertainty. Scores of cases take up the question 
of data shortages, and often result in directives for more study, investigation, 
and even experimentation. The leading cases include Refs. [ 82-851. (NEPA 
often is invoked for data supplementation purposes [ 8687 ] . ) Reaction to these 
cases turns chiefly upon one’s normative assessment of whether the line on 
how much information is enough was wisely drawn [ 22-251. The benzene case 
[ 881 is one where the Supreme Court went too far by calling for the production 
of data that was not practicably available. 
Indeterminacies, sometimes mistaken for mere data shortages by lawyers 
[ 561, are also commonplace in the case law [ 891. Predictably, the courts require 
disclosure of those questions that cannot be answered and recognition of the 
limitations of the methodologies employed [ 891. This disclosure obviously may 
invite disagreement and questioning of the agency opinions. 
Historical uncertainties, sensitive as they are to choice of methodology, are 
also dealt with in the course of hard-look review by requiring disclosure, includ- 
ing assumptions, authoritative studies, or qualified guesses serving as the foun- 
dation of the analysis [ 90 ] . While the choice of assumptions in, say, cancer 
research, ultimately may represent value judgments, they are judgments that 
are closely held, confined to the inner sanctum, and hardly open to repudiation 
by the public at large. In these instances the hard look may function to force a 
debate among experts by requiring the agency to answer this plausible objec- 
tion or explain why it dismissed that credible opinion or chose this assumption 
over that one. Few scientists realize that the aura of credibility customarily 
associated with reports of panels of the National Academy of Sciences, to men- 
tion but one example, means that the agencies must give plausible explana- 
tions for departing from this advice [ 911. 
At the level of transcientific policy choices, courts require explanation of the 
salient considerations and the basic policy choices that made risk A acceptable 
and risk B unacceptable. Because these choices depart from a scientific model, 
where technical analysis and professional opinion hold sway, and approach the 
world of pure political choice, one is likely to find that judges are vigilant to 
expose the value choices that may be revised by political second-guessing [ 921, 
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and to enforce rights of public participation [ 931. The Supreme Court’s deci- 
sion in the PANE case [ 941, excusing disregard of psychological effects from 
the start-up of the reactor at Three Mile Island, is open to criticism as being 
insufficiently sensitive to the fact that “correct” global risk assessment should 
give weight not only to technical consensus but also to popular opinion [ 951. 
Conclusions 
While the agencies grapple with uncertainties, the courts grapple with agency 
methodologies. The result is a coevolutionary normative commentary on the 
agency treatment of data shortages, indeterminacies, historical uncertainties, 
and transcientific policy judgments. Courts also oversee choices that are made 
on fact-gathering and risk acceptability. Statutory charters, and their less 
explicit purposes, are used to identify salient features of a risk that suffice to 
point the way to provisional choice. Judicial review also serves to open process 
doors so that losers may be heard and winners kept insecure in conflicts per- 
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